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Girls Should Bring Lawsuits Everywhere
... Nothing Will Be Corrupted:
Pornography as Speech and Product
Marianne Wessont
The Congress finds that. . . it is a tradition of Anglo-American ju-
risprudence that victims should be made whole by the ability to re-
cover damages for the harm caused them attributable to the miscon-
duct of others.
Preamble to the Pornography Victims Compensation Act.'
Senators considering the measure ... should look beyond its alleg-
edly lofty intent and see it for what it is: a far-reaching, repressive,
and probably unconstitutional attempt to stifle protected speech.
Washington Post editorial on the Pornography Victims Compensation
Act.'
At the beginning of his recent anti-censorship memoir Girls
Lean Back Everywhere: The Law of Obscenity and the Assault on
Genius, obscenity lawyer Edward de Grazia quotes Jane Heap as
saying, "[g]irls lean back everywhere, showing lace and silk stock-
ings; wear low-cut sleeveless blouses, breathless bathing suits; men
think thoughts and have emotions about these things every-
where-seldom as delicately as Mr. Bloom-and no one is cor-
rupted."3 De Grazia then proceeds to castigate (among others)
t Professor of Law and President's Teaching Scholar, University of Colorado. A version
of this paper was given at the conference on "Speech, Equality, and Harm: Feminist Legal
Perspectives on Pornography and Hate Propaganda" at the University of Chicago Law
School, March 5-7, 1993. For suggestions and encouragement I am grateful to the University
of Colorado Feminist Work-in-Progress Study Group, especially Marcia Westkott, Glenn
George, Alison Jaggar, Carol Glowinsky, Charlotta Hensley, Lori Gruen, Cate Wiley, Re-
becca French, and Hardy Long Frank; I also thank Emily Calhoun and Arthur Travers for
always helpful criticism and Mary Ann Davitt and Lauren Edelstein for excellent research
assistance. But this article is for Anita Hill, although we have never met.
1 S 1521, 102d Cong, 1st Sess, in 137 Cong Rec 10554 (July 22, 1991).
2 Editorial, Does Reading Lead to Rape, Washington Post A20 (May 21, 1991).
3 Edward De Grazia, Girls Lean Back Everywhere: The Law of Obscenity and the As-
sault on Genius 10 (Random House, 1992) ("Girls Lean Back"). Heap was a feminist and
lesbian who, with her lover Margaret Anderson, ran the Washington Square Bookstore and
co-edited the literary magazine The Little Review beginning in 1916. The two women were
arrested in 1920 and convicted of publishing obscenity after printing an episode from
Ulysses. In that episode, a character "leaned back and her garters were blue to match on
account of the transparent and they all saw it and shouted to look. . . ." Leonard Bloom is
among the observers and as the woman leans farther and farther back to watch the progress
of a firework, he "could see her other things too, nainsook knickers, four and eleven ...
The University of Chicago Law Review
those whom he calls "anti-porn feminists." The Heap quotation is
singularly infuriating for it suggests that the romantic pictures
conjured up-girls reclining in lacy underwear, beautiful women
exposing their bare arms to the sun-are characteristic of the
materials that anti-pornography feminists seek to suppress. Fur-
thermore, it hints that those who fight against pornography are
paranoid in their belief that such sights will "corrupt" the viewer. I
suggest that this ascription of paranoia to the anti-pornography ac-
tivist may be a bit of projection: it is, after all, persons in Mr. de
Grazia's camp who often suggest that any discouragement of the
pornography industry will lead to book-burning, empty libraries,
and thought control.5 1 offer here a practical proposal for anti-por-
nography activists, to wit: Girls should bring lawsuits everywhere. I
will argue that if my proposal is pursued, nothing that a civil liber-
tarian holds dear will be harmed.6
Proposals to permit victims of pornography to recover dam-
ages from those who create or distribute it are among the most
defensible and conservative items on the agenda of anti-pornogra-
phy activism, yet they are still controversial.7 The reasons why
these proposals still stir opposition lie partly in history, partly in
the politics of the women's movement, partly in the Supreme
Court's confused and confusing treatment of First Amendment is-
sues, and partly in the efforts of the pornography industry to pro-
tect its privileges and profits. The intersection of these factors has
hindered serious feminist consideration of measures that might ac-
complish many of the goals of the anti-pornography movement.
The measure I propose to fill this gap is quite simple: it requires
no debate, no lobbying, no legislation. All it requires is the right
client and the right lawyer. The right client will be a person (most
likely a woman) who has been harmed by an identifiable work or
[and] he could see up high above her knee where no-one ever and she wasn't ashamed and
he wasn't either to look in that immodest way. . . ." Id at 9-10. Heap's statement was made
to the readers of The Little Review in defense of the decision to publish the chapter. See
Jane Heap, Art and the Law, 7 The Little Review 5-6 (No 3 1967).
" De Grazia, Girls Lean Back at 581-86, 609-21.
Id at xii-xiii.
6 1 use the phrase to mean one who values arrangements that maximize freedom for the
greatest number of persons.
I See, for example, Maureen Dezell, Bundy's Revenge: Pornography Victim's Compen-
sation Act, New Republic 15 (Mar 9, 1992); James J. Kilpatrick, Alas, Well-Intentioned
Pornography Bill Would Accomplish Little of Substance, Atlanta Journal All (Aug 26,
1992); A Damaging Remedy for Sex Crimes, NY Times A18 (Apr 13, 1992); Ellen Willis, An
Unholy Alliance, Newsday 78 (Feb 25, 1992); Marcia Pally, Don't Blame Pornography for
Sexual Violence, St. Petersburg Times 20A (Feb 15, 1992); Wendy Kaminer, Feminists
Against the First Amendment, The Atlantic 110 (Nov 1992).
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works of pornography. The right lawyer will be a person (again,
most likely a woman) with the resources to bring a lawsuit against
the maker or distributors of the material, or both, and the skill to
prove the harm, show its foreseeability and its causal link to the
pornography, identify the source of the pornography, and over-
come the First Amendment objections that are certain to arise.
A brief rehearsal of familiar events may provide some context
for this proposal. Pioneering efforts to create remedies for victims
of pornography defined both "pornography" and "victim" in an ex-
pansive way. In particular, the MacKinnon-Dworkin Model Ordi-
nance and its progeny included in their definition of pornography,
"women . . . presented in scenarios of degradation, humiliation,
injury, torture, shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or
hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual. . . presented
dehumanized as sexual objects, things, or commodities . . . [and]
presented in postures or positions of sexual submission, servility,
or display," if these depictions constitute the "graphic sexually ex-
plicit subordination of women."8 The ordinances also provided for
enforcement actions to be brought by "[a]ny woman . . . acting
against the subordination of women."9 If a woman could prove that
certain material met the ordinance's definition of pornography, an
injunction against the further sale or dissemination of the material
could be obtained.10
I admire and salute the efforts of MacKinnon, Dworkin, and
others who worked tirelessly on the campaign for the ordinances,
but their success lay more in reframing the issue of pornography,
creating a convincing language for talking about it, and calling at-
tention to its harm, than in securing a remedy. Indeed, the Model
Ordinance was held to be unconstitutional under the First
Amendment."'
Moreover, even some self-described feminists opposed the or-
dinances, arguing that they could be used to censor such main-
stream speech as the Lina Wertmuller film Swept Away and many
' Model Antipornography Civil-Rights Ordinance, reprinted in Andrea Dworkin and
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography and Civil Rights: A New Day For Women's Equal-
ity 138-39 ("Model Ordinance"). A version of the Model Ordinance was enacted in the city
of Indianapolis. Indianapolis Code § 16-1 et seq (1984). It was a challenge to the Indianapo-
lis version that led to the American Booksellers Ass'n v Hudnut decision. See text accompa-
nying note 11.
I Model Ordinance at 141.
10 Id at 142.
11 American Booksellers Ass'n v Hudnut, 598 F Supp 1316 (S D Ind 1984), aff'd, 771
F2d 323 (1985), aff'd mere, 475 US 1001 (1986).
1993]
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images of women used in common advertising. 12 Canadian novelist
Margaret Atwood published The Handmaid's Tale, a bleak dys-
topian novel in which a movement aimed at suppressing pornogra-
phy and violence against women led eventually to the governmen-
tal appropriation of the bodies of women for reproductive purposes
and the enforcement of a harshly Puritanical code of sexual con-
duct, a code shaped and enforced by women but serving the needs
of a totalitarian patriarchy.'" It was difficult not to read this pow-
erful book as, among other things, a critique of the anti-pornogra-
phy movement.
Some proponents of the ordinances berated their opponents
for disloyalty to their gender. 4 Scientists on whose work many had
relied to support the claim that pornography's existence harms
women claimed that they had been misrepresented; at best, they
argued, their work shows a link between exposure to "violent" por-
nography and attitudinal changes that might lead to violent behav-
ior toward women. 15 In general, the atmosphere in which the por-
nography question was discussed became threatening and divisive.
I suspect that many women who consider themselves feminists
were relieved when the Supreme Court chilled discussion of the
Model Ordinance approach by summarily affirming the Seventh
Circuit's ruling that the Indianapolis version of that ordinance was
unconstitutional.
Throughout all of this history, those who make and profit
from pornography maintained a campaign to preserve their privi-
lege to publish and sell materials without legal interference. The
"industry," a shadowy and daunting network, relied on "moderate"
organizations like the ACLU and the Playboy Foundation to con-
tinue to portray anti-pornography feminism as a threat to every-
12 See Feminist Anti-Censorship Task Force Appellate Brief Amici Curiae in American
Booksellers Ass'n v Hudnut, 771 F2d 323 (7th Cir 1985) (Dkt No 84-3142, filed Apr 8, 1985),
reprinted in Nan D. Hunter and Sylvia A. Law, Brief Amici Curiae of Anti-Censorship
Task Force et al., 21 U Mich J L Ref 69 (1988) ("FACT Brief"). Indeed, Susan Faludi's
popular book Backlash exposed the extent to which images of women in advertising were
probably "pornographic" within the definition of the Model Ordinance. See Susan Faludi,
Backlash 199 (Crown, 1991).
" Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid's Tale 50-51, 152, 225-26, 273 (Ballantine, 1985).
" See, for example, Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on
Law and Life 198-205 (Harvard, 1987); Dorchen Leidholdt, When Women Defend Pornog-
raphy, in Dorchen Leidholdt and Janice G. Raymond, eds, The Sexual Liberals and the
Attack on Feminism 125-31 (Pergamon, 1990).
5 Daniel Linz, Steven D. Penrod, and Edward Donnerstein, The Attorney General's
Commission on Pornography: The Gaps Between "Findings" and Facts, 1987 Am Bar
Found Res J 713, 721-22.
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one's freedom of speech.16 Feminists who dedicated themselves to
contesting pornography's freedom to harm were labeled puritani-
cal,17 moralistic,' 8  anti-sex,' 9 anti-love,20  fascist reactionaries.2
When a well-known constitutional law scholar expressed the view
that the Model Ordinance was "not obviously unconstitutional,"
an equally well-known columnist suggested that the scholar's
highly regarded mind had "turn[ed] to mush. ' 22 Authors of such
feminists classics as Our Bodies, Ourselves opposed the passage of
anti-pornography ordinances because they feared the laws would
be used to censor their work.23 Mainstream booksellers and au-
thors were persuaded to denounce any efforts to control either the
magnitude of pornography production or its increasingly violent
content.24 Divided, exhausted, and confused, many feminists de-
cided they would rather move on to other issues, of which there
are, after all, many.
But others began considering and debating possible revisions
to or variations on the MacKinnon-Dworkin ordinances, with an
eye to finding a less-sweeping alternative. One result of these dis-
cussions was the Pornography Victims Compensation Act,
18 See, for example, Dorchen Leidholdt, Introduction, in Leidholdt and Raymond, eds,
The Sexual Liberals and the Attack on Feminism at xi-xii.
17 See, for example, FACT Brief, 21 U Mich J L Ref at 69 (cited in note 12) (associating
proponents of the Model Ordinance with the "sexual purity" movement).
18 Barbara Dority, Feminist Moralism, "Pornography," and Censorship, in Robert M.
Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum, eds, Pornography: Private Right or Public Menace? 111,
112 (Prometheus, 1991).
11 De Grazia, Girls Lean Back at 586 (cited in note 3), quoting Hugh Hefner.
20 See, for example, Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind 103 (Simon and
Schuster, 1987) ("[F]eminists are against [pornography] because it is a reminiscence of the
old love relationship.").
21 De Grazia, Girls Lean Back at 617 (cited in note 3), quoting Anne Rice. But these
were some of the nicer epithets. A correspondent of Playboy magazine characterized Catha-
rine MacKinnon, for her persistence in pursuing the pornography issue after the Hudnut
decision, as "the Freddy Krueger of the feminist movement." James R. Petersen, Catharine
MacKinnon: again, Playboy 37 (Aug 1992). Perhaps the most bizarre suggestion was Wendy
Kaminer's that anti-pornography forces consisted of "multiculturalists, poststructuralists,
and advocates of traditional family values." Kaminer, Feminists Against the First Amend-
ment at 110 (cited in note 7).
" De Grazia, Girls Lean Back at 613 (cited in note 3), quoting Nat Hentoff's comments
on Laurence Tribe.
"1 See FACT Brief, 21 U Mich J L Ref at 73-74 n 24 (cited in note 12) (Boston
Women's Health Book Collective worked against Cambridge version of the Model
Ordinance).
" Writers joining the FACT Brief included Rita Mae Brown, Rosemary Daniell, Betty
Dodson, Vivian Gornick, Carolyn Heilbrun, Del Martin, Kate Millett, Felice Picano, Minnie
Bruce Pratt, Adrienne Rich, Alix Kates Shulman, Barbara Smith, and Ellen Willis. Other
members of FACT include bookstore owners, editors, publishers, critics, and filmmakers.
See id at 89-98.
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designed to "allow victims of sexual assault to sue distributors of
obscene material or child pornography. '25 Introduced in the Senate
in 1991 by Senator Mitch McConnell of Kentucky, the bill was ap-
proved, in slightly different form, by the Judiciary Committee in
1992.26 The bill has some 'virtues, and also some serious defects;
nevertheless, most of its critics ignored both and based their oppo-
sition on likening the proposal to the MacKinnon-Dworkin ordi-
nance. They took note of the vast differences between the two only
to minimize them, and characterized the new law as a warmed-over
version of a measure already declared unconstitutional.2 7 It was ar-
gued in editorial pages across the nation that the bill was danger-
ous;28 it was argued with equal conviction that if passed, it would
be completely ineffective.29 It was given the nickname "the Bundy
Bill, 30 and various critics seized on the suggestion conveyed by the
nickname to argue that it would allow murderers and rapists to
evade responsibility for their crimes." State lawmakers have not
been entirely absent from the scene. In 1990, Illinois passed a civil
liability statute that provides for civil suits by victims of sex
32crimes. Although not identical, it resembles the McConnell bill in
enabling suits against distributors of obscene material. Massachu-
setts briefly considered passing a statute resembling the original
MacKinnon-Dworkin Model Ordinance.3 3 One scholar has recom-
mended the passage of legislation to enable feminists to bring
25 S 1521, 102d Cong, 1st Sess, in 137 Cong Rec 10554 (July 22, 1991).
S 1521, 102d Cong, 2d Sess, in 138 Cong Rec 12570 (Aug 12, 1992). For a history of
the legislation, see Morrison Torrey, The Resurrection of the Anti-Pornography Ordinance,
2 Tex J Women & L 113, 116 (1993).
21 See, for example, Kaminer, Feminists Against the First Amendment at 110 (cited in
note 7); Dezell, Bundy's Revenge at 15 (cited in note 7).
28 See, for example, Dezell, Bundy's Revenge at 15; Willis, An Unholy Alliance at 78
(cited in note 7); Tom Teepen, Bill Poses Threat to Free Speech, Atlanta Journal & Consti-
tution All (Mar 31, 1992).
29 See, for example, Kilpatrick, Well-Intentioned Pornography Bill at All (cited in
note 7) (law is "all form and no substance").
30 See Torrey, 2 Tex J Women & L at 116 n 17 (cited in note 26) ("The Act is colloqui-
ally known as the 'Bundy Bill' after the convicted serial killer Ted Bundy, who made a
statement on the eve of his execution that pornography had fueled his violent fantasies
which he then acted out."); Dezell, Bundy's Revenge at 15; A Damaging Remedy, at A18
(cited in note 7).
31 See, for example, Teepen, Bill Poses Threat at All.
22 720 ILCS 5/12-18.1 (1992). For a discussion of both the McConnell and Illinois bills,
see Torrey, 2 Tex J Women & L 113; Thomas C. Palmer, Jr., A Bill of Divorcement: Women
Are Split on Anti-pornography Law, Boston Globe 69 (Mar 29, 1992).
11 Mass HB 5194, 177th Gen Ct, Reg Sass (Feb 28, 1992). See Tamar Lewin, Pornogra-
phy Foes Push for Right to Sue, NY Times 16 (Mar 15, 1992); Torrey, 2 Tex J Women & L
113 (cited in note 26).
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"group defamation" lawsuits against pornographers54 These pro-
posals are not ideal vehicles for the next stage of the anti-pornog-
raphy debate-the McConnell bill and its Illinois relative are tied
to the antiquated and preposterous definition of "obscenity" pro-
pounded by the United States Supreme Court over the years,35 and
require as a precondition to the maintenance of the civil action
that the pornographer and the perpetrator of the sex crime be con-
victed of crimes. In the case of the McConnell bill, it is unclear
what advantage would be served by creating a federal cause of ac-
tion for a matter that could be left to state tort law. As to the
proposed Massachusetts law, it is doubtful that courts would find
it any less unconstitutional than its ancestor. The "group libel"
proposal would create a crime, an approach that might decrease
the prevalence of pornography, but would leave individual victims
without remedies. Nevertheless, the shortcomings of these particu-
lar pieces of legislation, and the criticism (both deserved and unde-
served) they have received should not stall discussion of a more
direct approach.
I. A (PERHAPS ExcESSIVELY) MODEST PROPOSAL3 6
It is difficult to go far in discussing pornography without de-
fining it. I define "pornography" as material that links the viewer's
or reader's sexual gratification to the infliction of violence. Pornog-
raphy is a depiction, in any medium, of violence directed against,
or pain inflicted on, an unconsenting person or a child, for the pur-
pose of anyone's real or apparent sexual arousal or gratification, in
a context suggesting endorsement or approval of such behavior,
3 See Jerome O'Callaghan, Pornography and Group Libel: How to Solve the Hudnut
Problem, 27 New England L Rev 363 (1992). But others, including vigorous advocates of
regulating pornography, deny that "group libel" is the most promising or appropriate char-
acterization. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography as Defamation and Discrimina-
tion, 71 BU L Rev 793, 807 (1991) ("The theory of group defamation does not adequately
encompass thd reality of pornography.").
3' See, for example, Miller v California, 413 US 15, 24 (1972). Next to Catharine
MacKinnon's observation that listening to the definition of obscenity sounds like hearing
the Miranda warnings, Feminism Unmodified at 174 (cited in note 14), my favorite com-
ment on this subject is Kathleen Sullivan's. She notes that the requirements that material
must both "appeal to prurient interest" and "be patently offensive" in order to be obscene
entail that the reader be simultaneously "turned on and grossed out." Kathleen M. Sullivan,
The First Amendment Wars, New Republic 35, 38 (Sep 28, 1992). Not many judges or ju-
rors, she suggests, "like to admit personally to being in such a double state." Id.
31 It has become something of a tradition in regulation-of-speech scholarship to talk
about modest proposals. See, for example, Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 Duke L J 484; Carole S. Vance and Anne Barr Snitow,
Toward a Conversation About Sex in Feminism: A Modest Proposal, 10 Signs 126 (1984).
1993]
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and that is likely to promote or encourage similar behavior in those
exposed to the depiction. I do not intend to suggest this definition
as legislative language, as I do not believe that legislation is neces-
sary or desirable to enable litigation of victim-harm suits against
pornographers. The definition is only a description of material that
I think is vulnerable to civil sanctions. I also do not mean to sug-
gest a definition that would preclude the use of other definitions in
other contexts. 7
Having offered this definition, I propose that persons claiming
to have been "proximately" harmed by a particular piece of por-
nography should bring civil actions against the originators and dis-
tributors of the material. New legislation should not be necessary
to enable such suits, as they are unexceptionable instances of per-
sonal liability litigation. It would be best if there were many such
suits pending at any given time, if there were a virtual campaign of
litigation that might spawn class actions, plaintiff's committees,
the invocation of the "complex rules,"3 8 and other court-created
management techniques. Techniques employed in other sorts of
mass-tort litigation, such as epidemiological evidence39 and mar-
ket-share liability,40 should be explored. First Amendment objec-
37 Elsewhere I have called this material the "new hard core," a term that appealed to
me because it reflects the shift in interest away from sexual explicitness and toward harm.
See Marianne Wesson, Sex, Lies and Videotape: The Pornographer as Censor, 66 Wash L
Rev 913, 915 (1991). The Report of the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography
used a similar definition (although broken down into three subcategories) for what it called
sexually violent materials. US Department of Justice, Attorney General's Commission on
Pornography, Final Report 323-24 (US GPO, 1986) ("Attorney General's Report").
" See Federal Judicial Center, Manual for Complex Litigation (Clark Boardman,
1978).
39 See, for example, Pritchard v Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F2d 292, 296 (3d Cir
1961) (approving epidemiological studies together with other scientific evidence concerning
smoking as a cause of cancer); Robinson v United States, 533 F Supp 320, 328 (E D Mich
1982) (analyzing epidemiological studies to hold against plaintiff); State Compensation
Fund v Yazzie, 25 Ariz App 89, 90, 541 P2d 415, 416 (1973) (epidemiological evidence ad-
missible to show radiation exposure caused cancer); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability
Litigation, 611 F Supp 1223, 1239-40 (E D NY 1985) (government epidemiological studies
admissible). See generally Comment, Causal Inference in Epidemiology: Implications for
Toxic Tort Litigation, 71 NC L Rev 247, 274-289 (1992); Michael Dore, A Commentary on
the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating Cause-in-Fact, 7 Harv Envir L Rev
429 (1983); Khristine L. Hall and Ellen K. Silbergeld, Reappraising Epidemiology: A Re-
sponse to Mr. Dore, 7 Harv Envir L Rev 441 (1983); Note, Proving Causation in Toxic
Torts Litigation, 11 Hofstra L Rev 1299 (1983).
40 See Hymowitz v Eli Lilly & Co., 73 NY2d 487, 539 NE2d 1069, 1071-72 (1989)
(adopting theory of market share liability in New York); Sindell v Abbott Laboratories, 26
Cal 3d 588, 607 P2d 924, 937-38 (1980) (adopting theory of market share liability in Califor-
nia); Hardy v Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F Supp 1353, 1356 (E D Tex 1981), rev'd on
other grounds, 681 F2d 334 (5th Cir 1982) (granting discovery on theory of market share
liability); Copeland v Celotex Corp., 447 S2d 908, 914-16 (Fla App 3d Dist 1984) (adopting
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tions undoubtedly will be made to any such suit as soon as it is
filed, but these objections can be answered. The following section
of this article suggests the form that the answer might take.
II. THE "RA.V." OBJECTION To SUITS AGAINST PORNOGRAPHERS
Proponents of measures to deter and punish "hate speech"
have often made common cause with proponents of measures to
restrict pornography, and some see pornography as a subset of
hate speech. The Supreme Court's recent decision in R.A. V. v City
of St. Paul was thus disquieting to both groups-in its particular
disapproval of the St. Paul measure to be sure, but also in its sug-
gestion that even speech "unprotected" by the First Amendment
may not be penalized if it was sanctioned because of its "view-
point," rather than its other features.41
Since many of the measures proposed to penalize the creation
and distribution of pornography are criticized for discriminating
against pornography because of the "viewpoint" it espouses, 2 it is
important to understand certain nuances of the R.A.V. opinions.
market share liability in asbestos case). But see York v Lunkes, 189 Il App 3d 689, 545
NE2d 478, 480 (1989) (refusing to employ market share liability when product is not "fungi-
ble" as between manufacturers); In Re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F Supp 1152, 1158 (N D
Cal 1982) (refusing to adopt market share liability in asbestos cases because brands of as-
bestos not "fungible"). See generally David A. Fischer, Products Liability-An Analysis of
Market Share Liability, 34 Vand L Rev 1623 (1981); Note, Market Share Liability: A Cur-
rent Assessment of a Decade-Old Doctrine, 44 Vand L Rev 395 (1991); Note, Market Share
Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94 Harv L Rev 668 (1981); Note, 11
Hofstra L Rev at 1302-06; Note, Market Share Liability ,and Asbestos Litigation: No Cau-
sation, No Cause, 37 Mercer L Rev 1115 (1986).
41 112 S Ct 2538 (1992). The Court held unconstitutional a St. Paul ordinance that
made it criminal to place on public or private property any symbol or graffito "which one
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others on
the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender." Id at 2541.
42 See Hudnut, 771 F2d 323, 332-33 (striking down MacKinnon-Dworkin Model Ordi-
nance because it represented "viewpoint discrimination"). Although some have urged that
pornography should not be considered speech at all, because its communicative content is
small, see, for example, Frederick Schauer, Speech and "Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscen-
ity": An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 Georgetown L J 899
(1979), or should be considered low-value speech because it does not "amount to part of an
appeal to deliberative capacities about public matters, or about matters at all," see Cass R.
Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With Special Reference to Pornography,
Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 Colum L Rev 1, 23 (1992), others have argued that pornogra-
phy carries a highly political message about the proper place of women in the polity. See, for
example, Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 924-25 (Foundation, 2d ed
1988); Geoffrey R. Stone, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination, 9
Harv J L & Pub Pol 461, 479-80 (1986); FACT Brief, 21 U Mich J L Ref at 119 (cited in
note 12). Others make the point that pornography is objectionable and dangerous precisely
because of the message-the highly political message-that it conveys. See Wesson, 66
Wash L Rev at 916 (cited in note 37).
1993]
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According to the majority, the St. Paul ordinance could not stand,
even if it had been successfully "narrowed" to encompass only the
unprotected category of "fighting words." Its flaw was that, even so
narrowed, it would punish only a subcategory of "fighting words":
those that had their effect "on the basis of race, color, creed, re-
ligion, or gender. '43 This aspect of the ordinance rendered it
"facially unconstitutional in that it prohibits otherwise permitted
speech solely on the basis of the subject the speech addresses."
44
The concurring opinions in R.A.V. exposed many gaps in the
majority's reasoning-especially Justice White's concurrence,
which observed that the majority acknowledged the existence of an
exception to the general prohibition of discrimination among sub-
categories of unprotected speech, an exception so large as to swal-
low completely the rule it announced.46 Justices Blackmun and
Stevens, also concurring, suggested that the Court had announced
a rule that had no application beyond the case before it. 46 It may
be, therefore, that anti-pornography efforts have nothing to fear
from R.A.V. because its purported rule was dead on arri-
val-fashioned (and perhaps even intended) to have no effect be-
yond its accompanying judgment. But it would be dangerous to as-
sume so. As others have pointed out, the recent tradition on the
-3 R.A.V., 112 S Ct at 2542. A largely unremarked ambiguity in this language is only
heightened by the narrowing construction given it by the Minnesota Supreme Court: does it
mean that the actor must merely have had in mind an animus based on the race, gender,
etc, of the victim (irrespective of the character of the fighting words), or does it mean that
the words themselves must convey to the victim or to a reasonable victim, or be intended to
convey to the victim, the existence and basis of the animus?
44 Id.
" Id at 2552-53 (White concurring). Justice Scalia explained the exception as applying
"[w]hen the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the
entire class of speech at issue is proscribable." Id at 2545. He offered the exception to ex-
plain why it is constitutional for the federal government to punish threats against the Presi-
dent when it does not criminalize threats in general. The exception was said to apply to
such a law because "the reasons why threats of violence'are outside the First Amendment
...have special force when applied to the person of the President." Id at 2546. But as
Justice White suggested, it is equally plausible to argue that the reasons why "fighting
woids" are outside the First Amendment have special force when applied to groups that
have historically been victims of discrimination. Id at 2556 (White concurring).
41 Justice Blackmun writes of the possibility that "this case will not significantly alter
First Amendment jurisprudence but, instead, will be regarded as an aberration." Id at 2560
(Blackmun concurring). And Justice Stevens suggests that either the majority has held that
"a government must either proscribe all speech or no speech at all," a result plainly incon-
sistent with numerous precedents, or that "the Court does not in fact mean much of what it
says in its opinion." Id at 2562 & n 1 (Stevens concurring).
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Court, especially among some of the Justices concurring in R.A.V.,
is one of respect for stare decisis.
4 7
In addition, there are other reasons-beyond those provided
by the concurring justices-why the decision in R.A.V. poses no
constitutional threat to civil actions for damages. R.A. V. concerned
the imposition of a criminal sanction.48 By contrast, the most simi-
lar civil cases to have faced a First Amendment challenge are defa-
mation actions by private (that is, non-public figure) plaintiffs. In
such cases, the First Amendment requires that the plaintiff prove
some degree of fault in the media defendant, and some actual
damage-but that is all.4
In connection with the implications of R.A.V., however, the
most important feature of civil suits against pornographers as I en-
vision them is that they are brought as just one of the many sorts
of personal injury actions that can be brought under a jurisdic-
tion's laws, requiring no specific statutory authorization. There is
nothing "underinclusive," in the sense condemned by R.A.V., in
the instituting or maintenance of such actions: they are not exclu-
sive or limiting except in the trivial sense that any lawsuit is exclu-
sive by claiming only what it claims and seeking only what it seeks,
rather than claiming or seeking all of the other matters that might
be claimed or sought under that jurisdiction's law. Of course, the
definition of pornography that I offer is exclusive, in the sense that
it does not include all sorts of speech or even all sorts of harmful
speech. But the definition is offered to satisfy, rather than to of-
fend, First Amendment constraints: to satisfy the requirement that
there be a showing of fault on the part of the maker or distributor,
and to define the type of damage that could foreseeably have been
expected to flow from the pornographic material by its very na-
ture." It excludes nothing. If another lawyer wishes to bring a dif-
ferent suit claiming that his client has been proximately harmed
47 See Daniel A. Farber, Foreword: Hate Speech After R.A.V., 18 Wm Mitchell L Rev
889, 894-95 (1992).
4' See MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 179 n 52 (cited in note 14). See also State
v Mitchell, 485 NW2d 807 (Wis 1992), rev'd on other grounds as Wisconsin v Mitchell, 113
S Ct 2194 (1993). ("[T]here is a difference between the civil penalties imposed under...
antidiscrimination statutes and [ ] criminal penalties ... while the First Amendment may
countenance slight incursions into free speech where the overarching concern is protection
from objective acts of bigotry, . . . the First Amendment will not allow the outright
criminalization of subjective bigoted thought."). But see New York Times v Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 277-78 (1964) (First Amendment permits neither criminal nor civil sanction for
false statements about public officials in absence of "actual malice").
" Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323, 347 (1974).
50 See text accompanying notes 96-99.
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by a violent but nonsexual film, a nonviolent advertisement for a
weight control program, or a classified ad soliciting the commission
of a crime, 5' nothing in what I propose prevents such suits. (There
may be something in the First Amendment to hinder them, but
that is the other lawyer's problem and not mine).
III. A FIRST AMENDMENT DEFENSE OF THE PROPOSAL
Apart from any complications posed by R.A.V., the recognition
and encouragement of victim actions against pornographers is con-
sistent with the premises and aspirations of the First Amendment.
Pornography is both speech and product. This double character
has confounded the debate about the constitutionality of laws (ac-
tual or proposed) that would penalize the creation or dissemination
of pornography. Those who emphasize the speech aspect point to
the First Amendment and its prohibition against any law "abridg-
ing the freedom of speech." 52 Those who find the product aspect
more important sometimes propose that the protection of the pub-
lic justifies a ban on the production or distribution of dangerous
products, of which they argue pornography is one. They also argue
that in the absence of a ban, those who sell pornography, like those
who profit from other commercial products, should be liable for
the harms their product causes. Sometimes there seems to be little
ground for compromise between these two views, but in fact they
share a commitment to a central model of free speech. Free-speech
advocates often defend and elaborate the Constitution's protection
of speech by reference to a concept borrowed from the world of
products: the "marketplace of ideas. ' 53 According to this theory,
51 See text accompanying notes 64-71.
52 See, for example, FACT Brief, 21 Mich J L Ref at 100 (cited in note 12). It is a
familiar observation, of course, that the First Amendment contains no such absolute prohi-
bition, but rather permits the outright suppression of some sorts of speech and the imposi-
tion of penalties on other forms. See, for example, MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at
208 (cited in note 14); Wesson, 66 Wash L Rev at 924 (cited in note 37).
53 The most famous expression of this notion is in Justice Holmes's dissent in Abrams v
United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes dissenting). As others have observed, it
borrows from Milton's Areopagitica the idea that truth cannot be "put to the worse in a
free and open encounter." John Milton, Areopagitica, in George H. Sabine, ed, John
Milton: Areopagitica and Of Education 50 (Harlan Davidson, 1951). The Supreme Court
has consistently reinforced its own use of this metaphor. See, for example Board of Educa-
tion v Pico, 457 US 853, 866 (1984); Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Hous-
ing v City of Berkeley, 454 US 290, 295 (1981); Widmar v Vincent, 454 US 263, 267 n 5
(1981); Columbia Broadcasting System v Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 US 94, 189 (1973)
(Brennan and Marshall dissenting). Defenders of free speech invoke the marketplace reflex-
ively. See, for example, Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First
Amendment, 43 U Chi L Rev 20, 25 (1975) ("The advancement of knowledge depends on
[60:845
Pornography As Speech and Product
the world of thought, analysis, emotion, and contemplation that is
expressed by speech is best protected by fostering a "marketplace"
in which all speech (and hence all expressible ideas, emotions,
opinions, and the like) may be offered to the would-be recipient,
who is free to listen or not, and to believe or not. Thus the discrim-
inating consumer of speech will make choices based on the quality
and persuasiveness of the marketplace's offerings, and in the end
the better, truer, and more beautiful speech will survive. One who
accepts this model will also accept another First Amendment
clich6: that the cure for bad speech is more speech.5" Law-and-
economics-school analysts and public choice theorists employ es-
sentially the same analysis-seeing the marketplace for speech as
similar to the marketplace for other products. 55
There are of course many things wrong with this metaphor,
most of which are obvious even from reading the rendition above.
As feminists and others have pointed out, there are many ways in
which the so-called "marketplace of ideas" does not at all resemble
a marketplace, or at best resembles a very flawed one. One prob-
lem is what economists call "barriers to entry": not everyone who
would like her ideas to be heard can afford to buy time on network
television. A.J. Liebling, speaking for an earlier era, observed that
"[f]reedom of the press is guaranteed only to those who own
one."5 Ross Perot is sufficient evidence, in this electronic age, of
this remark's lasting relevance. The metaphor's depiction of gov-
ernmental censorship as an interference with universal access to
the channels of communication may be apt, but it ignores the cen-
soring effect of poverty (or anything less than affluence), or illiter-
acy. Another related shortcoming of the marketplace model is that
unfettered competition between today's prevailing opinions and those opinions that may
come to prevail tomorrow."). It is the dominant paradigm invoked by the courts and by civil
libertarians. See, for example, Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing
Myth, 1984 Duke L J 1, 2-3.
Whitney v California, 274 US 357, 375 (1926) (Brandeis concurring) ("[T]he fitting
remedy for evil counsels is good ones."). But see Toni M. Massaro, Equality and Freedom of
Expression: The Hate Speech Dilemma, 32 Wm & Mary L Rev 211, 218 (1991) (characteriz-
ing this sentiment as a "bromide"); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go:
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke L J 431, 476 (characterizing it as an
"empty ideal").
" See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 627 (Little, Brown, 3d ed 1986)
('Ideas are a useful good produced in a highly competitive market. The marketplace of
ideas of which Holmes wrote is a fact, not merely a figure of speech."); Daniel A. Farber,
Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amendment, 105 Harv L Rev
554 (1991).
56 Richard Kluger, The Paper: The Life and Death of the New York Herald Tribune
341 (Knopf, 1986).
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it does not account for the "silencing" effect of some speech: the
speaker with the loudest amplifier may make it impossible for lis-
teners to sample the words or sounds of alternative speakers, or
one speaker may capture the market by discouraging his listeners
from listening to others. Some feminists have claimed that pornog-
raphy has this silencing 6ffect on the voices of women, especially
when they wish to speak of sexuality and equality.57 But even if
the "marketplace" of ideas is flawed in these ways, its flaws will be
magnified if pornography is insulated from the discipline the mar-
ketplace imposes on other products. I propose, therefore, to inquire
into what follows if one accepts the civil libertarian and utilitarian
view of speech as a market.
I will argue that this "market" view entails not only tolerating,
but affirmatively insisting on, the right of pornography's victims to
sue its creators for damages when a causal link between the por-
nography and the damage may be established. This proposition
may be surprising, since civil libertarian groups and speakers have
consistently opposed not only bans on producing or distributing
pornography, but also the creation of any tort remedies for those
who are harmed by it.55 Nevertheless, the necessity of such reme-
dies is implicit in the free marketplace theory of the First
Amendment.
It is a fundamental feature of an efficient marketplace that it
be free of externalities, 9 where an externality is the imposition of
some cost to a transaction on someone other than the parties.60 Air
pollution is an externality to the transaction of producing,
purchasing, and using an automobile, and a perfect market would
require that the cost of preventing or cleaning up the pollution
generated by an automobile be built into the transaction-whether
by requiring that all vehicles have expensive anti-pollution equip-
17 See Susan Griffin, Pornography and Silence: Culture's Revenge Against Nature 1-2
(Harper & Row, 1981); MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 181 (cited in note 14); Wes-
son, 66 Wash L Rev at 934-36 (cited in note 37). For more general critiques of the market-
place theorists, see Ingber, 1984 Duke L J 1 (cited in note 53); Cass R. Sunstein, Free
Speech Now, 59 U Chi L Rev 255 (1992).
" See notes 27-28 and accompanying text. See also Nadine Strossen, A Feminist Cri-
tique of "The" Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 Va L Rev 1099, 1188-90 (1993) (letter
from Feminists for Free Expression to Senate Judiciary Committee opposing Pornography
Victims Compensation Act).
59 See Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 254 (Little, Brown, 4th ed 1992)
("[Tihe most dramatic economic function of the common law is to correct externalities.");
Burton A. Weisbrod, Public Interest Law: An Economic and Institutional Analysis 10, 289
(California, 1978).
60 See Weisbrod, Public Interest Law at 10, 289.
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ment, imposing a tax on each sale, or some other stratagem (such
as taxing each gallon of gasoline sold or collecting tolls for the use
of roads). In the absence of some accounting for the cost of pollu-
tion, the cost is borne by all who breathe (if no mitigation meas-
ures are taken) or all who pay general taxes (if they are undertaken
by the government); in its absence as well, manufacturers and sell-
ers of vehicles have no economic incentive to minimize pollution,
nor have purchasers any economic incentive to favor (or certainly
to pay more for) vehicles that pollute less. Economic analysts agree
virtually unanimously that a rational market must force producers
of polluting vehicles to internalize the cost of the pollution their
vehicles will produce-otherwise, air pollution and its harms will
increase to the detriment of all, including those who have no inter-
est in and derive no benefit from the transaction. 1 Economic in-
justice will certainly result, and perhaps overall economic ineffi-
ciency, since it is possible that the overall cost of air pollution
exceeds the marginal economic benefit gained from manufacturing
and driving vehicles that create it (rather than non-polluting
vehicles).
Thus if the transaction that encompasses the creation, distri-
bution, and consumption of pornography is one that creates a seri-
ous external harm, the logic of the marketplace dictates that the
pornography industry should internalize the harm. A tax on por-
nography is neither feasible nor efficient, since arguments are cer-
tain to arise about whether or not particular items are "pornogra-
phy"62 and various pornographic materials almost certainly differ
in the harm they cause. But if outsiders to the transaction (that is,
women and others who can show they have been harmed by por-
nography) can recover compensation for the harm the transaction
imposes on them, those who profit from the transaction will bear
the cost; the harm will be internalized. Pornography will become
more expensive to produce as those who traffic in it must set aside
funds to pay for anticipated damage awards, or to purchase insur-
ance. Those who do not take these precautions may be forced to go
out of business if a large award consumes their operating capital.
The price of pornography will rise, and it may consequently attract
61 See id at 14, 292; Frank J. Vandall, Strict Liability: Legal and Economic Analysis
22-23 (Quorum, 1989).
"2 On defining "pornography," see text accompanying note 37.
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fewer customers. Its remaining creators may decide to stop dissem-
inating it. This is not censorship-it is the market at work.1
3
IV. THE MARKET AT WORK: RECENT CASES
Some readers may doubt that courts will ever be persuaded to
treat speech like a product and subject it to the discipline of the
market. But consider the recent case Soldier of Fortune v Braun.
64
Soldier of Fortune is a magazine, published in my hometown of
Boulder, Colorado, devoted to the cult of manly mercenary vio-
lence. In addition to articles about survivalism, weapons, and its
writers' adventures -in various world hotspots, the magazine at one
time published classified advertising. In one of these ads Michael
Savage advertised his willingness to accept work requiring
"[b]odyguard, courier, and other special skills" (although he prom-
ised "[a]ll jobs considered"); among his qualifications he listed "37
year old professional mercenary," "Vietnam Veteran," and
"[d]iscretee5 and very private." Among those responding to the ad
were Bruce Gastwirth and Horton Moore, who had failed in three
previous attempts to murder Gastwirth's business partner Richard
Braun and apparently had decided they needed professional assis-
tance. Gastwirth and Moore enlisted Savage's help, and within
three months of the day the ad first appeared in Soldier of For-
tune, Braun was dead-murdered by a man named Doutre, appar-
ently assisted by Savage. The attack also injured Braun's teen-age
son Michael.
Michael Braun and his brother filed a civil action against Sol-
dier of Fortune seeking damages for the death of their father
(under Georgia's wrongful death action) and for the injuries in-
flicted on Michael. A federal jury awarded the Brauns two million
dollars, in compensatory damages on their wrongful death claim,
and $375,000 in compensatory and ten million dollars in punitive
damages for Michael Braun's personal injury claim. 6 On appeal,
Soldier of Fortune argued that the First Amendment prohibits the
imposition of damages (particularly such "crushing" damages) on
publishers, but the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit re-
jected this argument, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Distinguishing this case from an earlier one in which the Fifth Cir-
0' For a similar argument, focused primarily on defamation but applicable to pornogra-
phy, see Frederick Schauer, Uncoupling Free Speech, 92 Colum L Rev 1321, 1326-24 (1992).
968 F2d 1110 (11th Cir 1992), cert denied, 113 S Ct 1028 (1993).
65 The Court of Appeals inserted "[sic]" at this point.
68 The punitive damages were later reduced to two million dollars in remittitur.
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cuit had overturned a jury verdict on similar facts, the Court of
Appeals noted that the Braun jury had found that the "ad in ques-
tion contained a clearly identified unreasonable risk, that the offer
in the ad is one to commit a serious violent crime. '6 7 The court
also rejected Soldier of Fortune's argument that it could not be
held responsible for independent acts of a third party. The court
observed that Georgia law, like that in most American jurisdic-
tions,6 8 allows for liability of an original tortfeasor when an inde-
pendent actor's conduct intervenes in the causal chain, if the acts
of the intervening party were foreseeable.6 9 The Supreme Court's
refusal to review the outcome of Soldier of Fortune v Braun sug-
gests that violent pornography, if defined as that which implicitly
but unmistakably advocates directing sexual violence against
women, can be the subject of a civil suit for damages without vio-
lating the First Amendment.
It may be objected that the Braun suit is different from the
sort of civil action advocated by anti-pornography feminists, be-
cause advertisements (including classified ads) are "commercial
speech" and hence deserve less First Amendment protection than
speech which is the product itself, not merely an advertisement for
it. It is true that the Court of Appeals treated the Soldier of For-
tune ad as "commercial speech," and noted that such speech has
diminished First Amendment protection.7 0 But other courts have
upheld damage awards for injuries caused by speech that was more
in the nature of "the thing itself" than of an advertisement for it.
Defamation of a private individual, for example, is actionable if it
is false and the publisher is negligent about that fact.
7 '
Or consider Weirum v RKO General, Inc., brought by the sur-
vivors of a man killed when his automobile was forced off a high-
way by a pair of cars.72 The teen-age drivers were listening to a
radio broadcast that continuously gave clues to the location of a
disc jockey who was driving around the region, and were attempt-
ing to locate the deejay in order to win a prize offered by the radio
station. A jury found the radio station liable for the death of the
67 Braun, 968 F2d at 1118, 1119-20 & n 10.
69 W. Page Keeton, ed, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 301-19 (West, 5th ed 1984).
69 968 F2d at 1122.
70 Id at 1118-19.
71 Gertz v Robert Welch, Inc., 418 US 323, 347 (1974).
71 123 Cal Rptr 468, 539 P2d 36 (1975). According to the court, one or the other of the
teen-age drivers forced the decedent off the road. 539 P2d at 39. One of the insurers settled
the plaintiffs' claim, and a trial jury returned a verdict against the other driver, together
with the radio station. Id.
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deceased, and the California Supreme Court rejected the station's
First Amendment argument as "clearly without merit," comment-
ing that "[t]he First Amendment does not sanction the infliction of
physical injury merely because achieved by word, rather than
act. 17  The broadcast was not an advertisement, but was the
speech itself. Yet those responsible were made to bear their share
of liability for the harm caused as surely as those responsible for
Soldier of Fortune's ad.
Of course, in neither Braun nor Weirum were the defendants'
words the immediate cause of the plaintiffs' injuries. The words
did not fly out and strike the victims, killing or injuring them.
Rather, they encouraged or enabled others to inflict the death or
injury, whether intentionally or accidentally. This pattern is often
observed in product liability and negligence suits, where many nec-
essary causes may intervene between the creation of the risk and
the victims' injuries: a person is attacked by an individual under
the influence of a dangerous prescription drug;7 a driver is injured
when a dump truck with defectively designed brakes, driven care-
lessly, collides with her car. It has never been the rule that the
intervening acts of a third party will inevitably cut off the liability
of the person who created the risk (although intervening actors
may share the liability and may be made, through various mecha-
nisms, to contribute to a judgment against the original tortfeasor).
In such cases, to impose liability on the original tortfeasor, a court
must find that she or he should have foreseen the risk that some
intervening actor might behave in the manner that caused the
plaintiff's harm.
Notice that no special legislation concerning liability for classi-
fied advertising or radio promotional contests was necessary to the
results in Braun or Weirum. The outcomes of these cases merely
represented the application of principles governing other product
liability or negligence lawsuits. These suits are approved by most
economic analysts of the law, because they contribute to the for-
mation or maintenance of efficient markets. Products that are
likely to cause harm must internalize the costs of the harm-either
by investing in measures designed to prevent it (for example, mak-
73 Id at 40. The court also rejected the station's argument that it should not be held
responsible for harm caused by the intervening negligent acts of another. This argument
fared no better under California law here than it did under Georgia law in Braun. See text
accompanying notes 68-69.
74 Jeannelle v Thompson Medical Co., 613 F Supp 346 (E D Mo 1985).
76 Bradford v Bendix-Westinghouse Automotive Air Brake Co., 517 P2d 406 (Colo App
1973).
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ing the Pinto crashworthy, at least for the sorts of crashes that it is
likely to encounter), or by shouldering the cost of the harms to
which it contributed. Those who persist in committing harmful
speech acts may eventually find it very difficult to stay in business,
but they are not compelled by any governmental agent to stop run-
ning classified ads placed by ambitious thugs or, broadcasting invi-
tations to drive like maniacs. Perhaps it would be better if they
were, but the First Amendment does not permit that result. The
same result may, however, be achieved over time by operation of
tort law, about which the First Amendment has much less (but not
nothing) to say.71
It is true that there are cases in which the First Amendment
has shielded the creators or publishers of speech that would have
generated tort liability, but for that shield. In Olivia N. v National
Broadcasting Company, for example, the plaintiff was deprived of
any recovery when the defendant's broadcast of the rape of a girl
with a "plumber's helper" was found to have caused a group of
boys to rape the plaintiff using the same method."7 The California
Court of Appeal found that the First Amendment required this re-
sult, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. In Herceg v Hustler
Magazine, Inc., no recovery was allowed when a teenaged boy
hanged himself, apparently while seeking to achieve an autoerotic
experience described in detail (together with the method of achiev-
ing it and a "warning" that the reader should not attempt the
practice) in the defendant's publication. 78 The Court of Appeals
reversed a judgment of $169,000 in favor of the boy's mother on
First Amendment grounds 7 9 and the Supreme Court again denied
certiorari.8 0 In Eimann v Soldier of Fortune, the Fifth Circuit
overturned a multimillion dollar verdict in favor of survivors of a
murder victim whose husband had hired an assassin from the clas-
sified ads of Soldier of Fortune magazine, and the Supreme Court
refused review.8 The lawyer who would represent the pornography
victim must contend with these precedents, but they do not pose
insuperable obstacles.
7' Compare Derrick Bell, Foreword. The Final Civil Rights Act, 79 Cal L Rev 597
(1991) (in which Bell's alter ego Geneva Crenshaw proposes a law permitting, but taxing
heavily, racial discrimination).
" 126 Cal App 3d 488, 178 Cal Rptr 888 (1981), cert denied as Niemi v National
Broadcasting Company, 458 US 1108 (1982).
758 814 F2d 1017 (5th Cir 1987).
79 Id at 1019, 1025.
80 485 US 959 (1988).
a' 880 F2d 830 (5th Cir 1989).
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The Olivia N. court suggested the outcome might have been
different if the program's depiction of the assault were an "incite-
ment" to commit a similar crime.2 Although the court hinted that
proof of "incitement" would require a showing that the defendant
intended to encourage the behavior,8" an alternative interpretation
of that term would encompass any implication that the broad-
caster, writer, or filmmaker approves of the conduct depicted.
Under this interpretation, the sort of suit I have suggested would
be consistent with the First Amendment, since my definition of
pornography includes only those materials that depict sexualized
violence in a context that implies approval of the same, and is
likely to encourage others to engage in it.
84
In Herceg, the plaintiff's attorneys premised their arguments
on appeal entirely on the theory that Hustler had incited Herceg's
experiment with autoerotic asphyxiation, abandoning their other
claims.8 5 The court did not find enough evidence of "incitement"
as it understood the term, in part because Hustler had included a
"warning" that its readers should not attempt the practice it de-
scribed, and in part because there was no proof that the article's
encouragement created an "imminent" danger. Although the dis-
senting opinion is certainly right in criticizing the majority's fanat-
ically wooden application of the categories generated by the Su-
preme Court's First Amendment cases,8" Herceg can be
distinguished as a case in which the plaintiff did not attempt to
articulate a theory of liability beyond that of "imminent incite-
ment to lawless action." In Eimann, the plaintiff's verdict was
overturned because the advertisement was held to be ambiguous as
a matter of law, and because the jury instructions suggested that
82 The trial judge had nonsuited the plaintiff at the close of her counsel's opening state-
ment because the lawyer had disclaimed any evidence that the defendant had "incited" the
conduct that victimized his client. Olivia N., 126 Cal App 3d at 491.
13 Id at 495 (Incitement means "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless ac-
tion and ... likely to incite or produce such action."). The court used the notion of "incite-
ment" to distinguish Weirum, arguing that in that case there was "incitement" of the listen-
ers, see Weirum, 539 P2d at 48, but nothing in the appellate opinion in Weirum suggests
the existence of any evidence that the radio station wanted or desired its listeners to drive
recklessly.
" See text accompanying note 37. This limitation is included in the definition to ex-
clude depictions designed to arouse the viewer's sympathy, pity, horror or anger without
implying the originator's approval of the conduct depicted.
85 814 F2d at 1019.
86 See id at 1025-30 (Jones concurring in part and dissenting in part). The majority
observes, for example, on the strength of the facts of Brandenburg v Ohio, 395 US 444
(1969), that "the root of incitement theory appears to have been grounded in concern over
crowd behavior." 814 F2d at 1023.
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Soldier of Fortune had a duty to investigate the "context" of the
ad. 87 The court did not rest its holding on the defendant's First
Amendment arguments, and the eventual outcome of Braun v Sol-
dier of Fortune confirms Einmann's limited reach.88
V. COMPLEXITIES OF CAUSATION AND HARM
In any suit of the sort I suggest, the plaintiff's attorney must
address two different types of causation. One is a general causal
relation between pornography (defined as I have suggested) and
violent harm to persons, and the other is the particular causal rela-
tion between certain pornographic material produced or distrib-
uted by the defendant and the harm suffered by the plaintiff. The
second of these tasks is, of course, one that must be undertaken by
any plaintiff's attorney in any personal injury lawsuit.8 9 The con-
geries of doctrines known collectively as the law of proximate cause
is both complex and uncertain,90 but no more so in this sort of case
than in many others. The intervening agency of a third party (the
rapist, the assailant, the one who forces pornography on the vic-
tim) does not defeat proof of a causal relationship between the
pornographic material and the harm, if some such harm was fore-
seeable by the pornographer-defendant.91 This last qualification
suggests the relationship between this particular causation require-
ment and the more general requirement of proving that pornogra-
phy causes harm. As more and more research seems to affirm that
exposure of men to violent sexual material leads to harm to
women,9 and as this research and its conclusions are publicized
and discussed, it will become more and more difficult for creators
and dealers of pornography to claim they did not foresee that their
activities would lead to harm. It will become correspondingly more
likely that juries and judges will accept the arguments of victims
that the risk of their injury-or the sort of injury they suf-
81 880 F2d 830 (5th Cir 1989). See also the discussion of Eimann in Braun, 968 F2d at
1115-16.
" 880 F2d at 836.
" Keeton, ed, Prosser & Keeton on Torts at 263 (cited in note 68) ("An essential ele-
ment of the plaintiff's cause of action for negligence, or for that matter any other tort, is
that there be some reasonable connection between the act or omission of the defendant and
the damage which the plaintiff has suffered.").
90 See Mark Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective Causation Judgments in Lib-
eral Political Theory, 63 Chi Kent L Rev 579 (1987).
91 Keeton, ed, Prosser and Keeton on Torts at 301-19.
92 See text accompanying notes 96-99.
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fered-was known to the defendant, or would have been known to
him had he been reasonably prudent.
The general causation requirement also performs an indepen-
dent function in such a lawsuit by reassuring the judge, who in its
absence would harbor a First Amendment-generated solicitude for
the defendant's conduct. In civil suits seeking damages for injuries
proximately caused by speech, courts have traditionally assuaged
their concerns about the speech-inhibiting character of a plain-
tiff 's recovery by observing that the defendant's speech was known
to be likely to cause harm.9 3 Whether phrased as an aspect of neg-
ligence or causation, evidence of the reasonably prudent defend-
ant's knowledge that his speech-act risks harm to another is an
integral ingredient of the plaintiff's case. 4 Hence my definition of
pornography has a built-in foreseeability element: "Pornography is
a depiction. . . likely to promote or encourage similar behavior in
those exposed to the depiction."95
I do not think that many plaintiff's attorneys will fail to pro-
duce evidence of a general causal link between exposure to violent
pornography and harm to women. Although some researchers have
been reluctant to affirm the existence of a link between exposure to
nonviolent sexual material and harmful changes in the subject's at-
titudes or thoughts, those who have done the most work in this
area acknowledge that exposure to materials that depict the inflic-
tion of pain or rape does have such a damaging effect. After a se-
ries of disputes about what they did and did not find, and whether
their work- had or had not been misused by anti-pornography
forces, 96 researchers Daniel Linz and Edward Donnerstein clarified
their views as follows:
Researchers have documented that men who view sexually vi-
olent materials in controlled situations may demonstrate in-
creased callousness toward women. The men undergo several
attitudinal and perceptual changes, tending to see a rape vic-
93 See, for example, Braun, 968 F2d 1110 (approving a "modified negligence" standard
for publishers of classified advertisements); Beauharnais v Illi'nois, 343 US 250, 253 (1952).
94 Gertz, 418 US at 347-48 (state cannot impose liability for defamation of private per-
son in absence of fault); Brandenburg, 395 US 444, 450-53 (Douglas concurring) (collecting
cases) (damages for "clear and present danger" speech must be foreseeable to be
recoverable).
95 See text accompanying note 37.
96 Compare Attorney General's Report at 299-351, 901-1035 (cited in note 37) (relying
on Donnerstein's work to show harm of pornography), with Linz et al, The Gaps Between
"Findings" and Facts (cited in note 15) (complaining that the Commission misused their
work).
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tim presented to them later as less injured and more responsi-
ble for her assault. The men are also more likely to endorse
myths such as the idea that women secretly enjoy sexual
assault.
9 7
Linz and Donnerstein emphasize, however, that these findings do
not suggest a relationship between exposure to nonviolent sexually
explicit material and any such attitudinal changes; indeed, they
claim that it is the violence of the material rather than the explic-
itness of its sexual content that makes it dangerous. "Slasher"
films, they say, are more likely to have harmful effects than some
X-rated materials.98 I believe that my definition of pornography,
"a depiction. . . of violence directed against, or pain inflicted on,
an unconsenting person or a child, for the purpose of anyone's real
or apparent sexual arousal or gratification," captures the essence of
the materials that have been documented as likely to lead to harm.
Note that the definition does not exclude materials that depict the
unconsenting victim as later grateful for being hurt or raped. Such
depictions are among the most infuriating to feminists, and for a
good reason; research suggests that such "positive outcome" depic-
tions of sexualized violence are among the most dangerous in in-
ducing dangerous attitudinal or behavioral changes in those ex-
posed to them.9
Many have argued that pornography is harmful to women in
more subtle and important ways than the positivistically proxi-
mate harm-inducing respect that would generate a successful law-
suit under my proposal. 00 I do not disagree with the claims of
those who argue that pornography (here used in a much broader
sense) harms women in ways that the clumsy drama of a lawsuit
cannot expose or compensate. As MacKinnon says,
Instead of [a] more complex causality . . . the view became
that pornography must cause harm the way negligence causes
car accidents or its effects are not cognizable as harm. The
trouble with this individuated, atomistic, linear, isolated, tort-
like-in a word, positivistic-conception of injury is that the
'7See Daniel Linz and Edward Donnerstein, Research Can Help Us Explain Violence
and Pornography, Chronicle of Higher Education B3 (Sep 30, 1992).
96 Id.
"9 See Edward Donnerstein, Daniel Linz, and Steven Penrod, The Question of Pornog-
raphy: Research Findings and Policy Implications 160 (Free Press, 1987); Diana Scully,
Understanding Sexual Violence: A Study of Convicted Rapists 55-58 (Unwin Hyman,
1990).
200 See, for example, Susan Griffin, Pornography and Silence at 3 (cited in note 57).
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way pornography targets and defines women for abuse and
discrimination does not work like this.10 1
I also do not disagree with the claims of MacKinnon and others
who argue that pornography (again, used in a broader sense) does
not just cause harm to women, it is harm to women. 102 I do not
doubt the power of speech and ideas to force identities onto
women that we have not chosen, yet find impossible to contest.
However, I do doubt whether a legal system that protects hate
speech that causes harm of a similar sort'0 will be persuaded to
uphold the prohibition of pornography because of the reality that
it constructs. But I do not propose a limit on what should "count"
as a cognizable legal harm.
The real source of disagreement here is less about causation
than about harm-about what counts as harm in the legal system.
It is true that many of the harms women encounter in their daily
lives do not "count" in lawsuits or criminal codes because they are
invisible, incomprehensible, or just uninteresting to those whose
interests constructed the law.104 It is also true that inspired lawyer-
ing can sometimes make those harms visible and illegal-that is,
can both "out" and "outlaw" them. 0 5 Although I doubt the success
of lawsuits predicated on a woman's emotional distress at being
perceived or constructed as less than fully human, the law of per-
sonal injury sometimes recognizes harms to the psyche. 06 From
the obvious case of the woman who is raped by a man to the ac-
companiment of a pornographic videocassette, to the far more
101 MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 156 (cited in note 14).
102 See, for example, Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Pornography and Harm to
Women: "No Empirical Evidence?", 53 Ohio St L J 1041, 1048 (1992) ("[P]ornography is a
per se harm, namely that of being derogatorily constructed as passive, hypersexual, maso-
chistic, a sexual plaything, and so on.") (emphasis added).
103 See R.A.V., 112 S Ct 2538.
104 For the best description, see generally Robin L. West, The Difference in Women's
Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wis Women's L J
81 (1987). See also Cynthia Grant Bowman, Street Harassment and the Informal Ghet-
toization of Women, 106 Harv L Rev 517, 518-20 (1993).
105 Catharine MacKinnon and others have proven this with their work on sexual harass-
ment. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women xi (Yale,
1979); Lin Farley, Sexual Shakedown: The Sexual Harassment of Women on the Job (Mc-
Graw-Hill, 1978). Their view was eventually adopted by the courts. See, for example, Mer-
itor Savings Bank v Vinson, 477 US 57, 73 (1986) (recognizing sexual harassment as a form
of illegal sex discrimination).
Other once-invisible harms that the legal system has (in some places) cbme to acknowl-
edge through the efforts of law reformers and litigators are marital rape, see State v Smith,
85 NJ 193, 426 A2d 38, 39 (1981), and domestic violence. See, for example, Simmons v
Simmons, 773 P2d 602, 603-04 (Colo App 1988).
100 Keeton, ed, Prosser and Keeton on Torts at 54-56 (cited in note 68).
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challenging case of a woman who feels imprisoned in her home af-
ter dark because of the clientele of the adults-only bookstore on
the corner, it must be left to the ingenuity, resourcefulness, and
eloquence of the attorneys in such cases to convince the judges and
juries that there has been real harm and legally compensable
injury.
Happily, one need not prove "causation" in these cases to the
satisfaction of a philosopher, 10 for the law's rules on causation are
not really rule-like, and are amenable to manipulation. 108 From the
standpoint of a critical legal theorist this is a bad thing, 0 9 but for
the proposal I make here, it is a blessing. I understand that there is
a continuous "background" exposure to sexualized violence against
women in print, on television, in advertising, and in movies. I also
appreciate the difficulty in separating the causal contribution of
this continuous background effect from that of any particular piece
or pieces of pornography. Nevertheless, I believe most jurors would
be horrified and disgusted by the sort of violent pornography that
this proposal targets. I believe further that their reaction would
lead them, where there is any evidence of a causal contribution, to
resolve doubt in favor of finding a causal connection between a
particular piece of pornography and any harm to a victim they find
believable and appealing. In the same way, jurors are often willing
to find that exposure to a particular carcinogen caused a worker's
cancer, even against a background of toxic exposure experienced
by all and despite defense arguments about the confounding of
causality that it occasions." 0
VI. OTHER OBJECTIONS CONSIDERED
I anticipate other objections to the campaign of personal in-
jury litigation that I suggest. Some will argue that placing liability
for the injuries of raped or assaulted women on pornographers will
create at least a psychological escape from responsibility, or even a
legal defense, for the criminal who immediately committed the
107 I thank my friend Alison Jagger for educating me on the difficulty of this enterprise.
The writings of Professor Frederick Schauer also promoted my appreciation of certain diffi-
culties. See, for example, Frederick Schauer, Causation Theory and the Causes of Sexual
Violence, 1987 Am Bar Found Res J 737 (discussing meaning of causal conclusions in the
Attorney General's Report).
108 See, for example, Kelman, 63 Chi Kent L Rev 579 (cited in note 90); Mark Kelman,
Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stan L Rev 591 (1981).
See Kelman, 33 Stan L Rev 591.
10 See, for example, Elam v Alcolac, Inc., 765 SW2d 42, 185-87 & n 63 (Mo App 1988).
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crime.m I cannot say I understand the psychology of violent
criminals well enough to address the first possibility, although Di-
ana Scully's work suggests that the opposite may be true-that it
is the availability and prevalence of pornography, in the absence of
any public suggestion that the scenes it depicts are wrong or objec-
tionable, that assuages whatever qualms the would-be sexual crimi-
nal might otherwise experience.112 In any event, the second concern
is not necessary. The law of solicitation allows for the guilt of both
the solicitor and the solicitee; that of complicity, for the guilt of
both the encourager and the actor. Both negligence and products
liability law recognize that two or more parties may be liable to an
individual for harm caused by the joint operation of their conduct.
To the extent the sexual criminal wishes to identify a particular
piece or pieces of pornography as having inspired his crimes, he
will find himself no less guilty. He may nevertheless wish to do so,
either to identify another party to share civil liability or for other
reasons, and by doing so will provide me with a partial answer to
another objection I anticipate.
This next objection I conceive as the opposite of "If you build
it, they will come."' 1 That is, it will be objected that even if law-
suits such as I describe would be heard by courts, and could over-
come First Amendment obstacles, no one will bring them-because
of the poverty of the likely plaintiffs, the uncertainty of recovery,
and the difficulty of identifying the source of the pornography.1 I
concede these difficulties, especially the last. Unless there is some
"signature" or other circumstance to suggest a sex criminal's inspi-
ration by a particular work of pornography, there may be insupera-
ble proof difficulties. As suggested above, however, the criminal
himself may disclose the identity of his despicable Muse. More-
over, I would expect resourceful plaintiff's attorneys to find ways
to deal with these difficulties, as did resourceful plaintiff's attor-
. See, for example, Damaging Remedy at A18 (cited in note 7).
122 Scully, Sexual Violence at 100-17 (cited in note 99). Close to half of the group
Scully studied were "deniers" who, despite having been convicted and quite apart from any
attempt to shift the blame to pornography, continued to claim they had not raped their
victims. Scully found that the principal source of this claim was their exposure to images of
women as whores, as teases, as creatures who don't know their own minds and say no when
they mean yes-that is, the sorts of images of women found in pornography. Id.
'3 From the film Field of Dreams, this mysterious phrase gives the hero to understand
that he should build a ballpark, and that if he does so dead baseball players will come to life
and compete there. He does and they do, of course. It says a great deal about some baseball
fans that they did not find this film sappy.
", This objection has been raised to the Pornography Victims Compensation Act. See
Kilpatrick, Well-Intentioned Pornography Bill at All (cited in note 7).
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neys in the asbestos litigation, where most of the stricken plaintiffs
had no idea who had manufactured the particular asbestos product
to which they were exposed.
115
A further objection, one that has been raised to almost every
proposal designed to discourage pornography, is that we need edu-
cation, not litigation. But the two do not exclude one another and
may converge in important respects. Litigation has played an enor-
mous educative role in this country's history, concerning issues
from desegregation to sexual harassment to rape to employment
discrimination. Moreover, entire research industries emerge once
issues become legal issues. When one's entitlement to certain legal
benefits depends on whether she suffers from a "learning disabil-
ity, 1 16 learning disability experts begin to appear. When lawsuits
begin to claim that exposure to high-intensity electromagnetic
fields may cause cancer or miscarriages, studies are done. When
DNA evidence begins to be admitted in criminal cases, labs begin
to tool up to do that kind of work. There has been some work on
the causes of sexual violence (both in general and in particular
cases), but there needs to be more. Similarly, recognizing lawsuits
against pornographers will encourage research into the effects of
pornography.
I also anticipate the objection that a proposal such as mine
will inevitably be turned in the first instance against feminist
speech. Such a fear animated the writers of the FACT brief, and
was expressed by many in the debate over the Model Ordinance.117
Audre Lorde's observation that "the Master's tools will never dis-
mantle the Master's house" captures the reservations of many fem-
inists toward strategies that would award a male-dominated legal
system a role in controlling violence against women.1 8 But I do not
believe that Lorde meant to caution against using any male-
originated power against continuing male dominance and violence;
such a universal caution would have discouraged enforcement of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (including those provisions later held
to prohibit sexual harassment), the reform of rape laws, the prose-
115 See Note, 11 Hofstra L Rev 1299 (cited in note 39); Sindell, 607 P2d 924.
116 See Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 USC §§ 12101-213 (1990); 28 CFR § 35.104
(1991); 29 CFR § 1630.2(h)(2) (1992).
11 See Robin Morgan, Theory and Practice: Pornography and Rape, in Laura Lederer,
ed, Take Back the Night: Women on Pornography 137 (Morrow, 1980); Anna Gronau,
Women and Images: Toward a Feminist Analysis of Censorship, in Varda Burstyn, ed,
Women Against Censorship 91 (Douglas & McIntyre, 1985).
I Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in
Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider 110-13 (Crossing, 1984).
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cution of domestic violence. I cannot conceive, moreover, of any
speech that I would call "feminist" that would fit within the defini-
tion of pornography used here-the depiction of unconsented sex-
ual violence in a context implying approval of the same and likely
to encourage the observer to do the same, that is to inflict uncon-
sented violence. I have read the arguments of lesbians and others
who value sadomasochistic sexual experiences119 and I do not un-
derstand them to argue for the value of speech that encourages
nonconsensual violence.
Finally, I expect this proposal to be criticized because it offers
too little. Catharine MacKinnon has said that individual lawsuits
by victims of pornography can never amount to more than a mop-
ping-up operation.120 This may be true, metaphorically speaking.
But others criticized MacKinnon and Dworkin's Model Ordinance
on the ground that in a world full of male violence, combatting
pornography was a task with very small potential for good1121 in
other words, a mopping-up operation. What I propose will not save
women from the use of rape as a political weapon in Bosnia, will
not heal the wounds of incest victims in Illinois or Colorado, prob-
ably will not eliminate pornography, even violent pornography. It's
mopping up, but women are good at that. When I visualize the
Master's tools, mops are not among them. If we wield them well,
we may well dismantle a part of his house.
119 See, for example, Paula Webster, Pornography and Pleasure, in Kate Ellis et al,
eds, Caught Looking (Real Comet, 1986); Barbara Ehrenreich, Elizabeth Hess, and Gloria
Jacobs, Re-making Love: The Feminization of Sex (Anchor, 1986); Linda Williams, Hard
Core: Power, Pleasure, and the "Frenzy of the Visible" (California, 1989); Pat Califia,
Sapphistry (Naiad, 1981).
120 MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 204 (cited in note 14).
121 See, for example, Ann Snitow, Retrenchment Versus Transformation: The Politics
of the Antipornography Movement, in Varda Burstyn, ed, Women Against Censorship 107
(cited in note 117); Lisa Duggan, Nan Hunter, and Carol S. Vance, False Promises: Femi-
nist Antipornography Legislation in the U.S., in Burstyn, ed, Women Against Censorship
130 (cited in note 117).
